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Abstract 
Secularisation remains a central but contested topic within the social sciences. Much of the 
debate around this concept has focused on how, to what extent and under what conditions 
processes of secularisation might, or might not, be active. One aspect that has remained 
relatively under-explored in these debates has been the impact of secularisation on the public 
discourse of religious actors. This article explores these issues through an analysis of 
religious opposition to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Britain. It shows that 
religious public discourse on this subject was characterised by the use of overtly secular (as 
opposed to theological) arguments, denoting a strategic shift in response to changes in the 
landscape of religion and belief. 
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Introduction 
Secularisation remains a central but contested topic within the social sciences. The concept 
dates back to some of the earliest theorists of religion, such as Karl Marx and August Comte, 
and encompasses a multi-dimensional theoretical approach, described by Phillip Gorski as a 
‘secularisation paradigm’ as opposed to a singular thesis.1 At the core of this approach lies 
the idea that religion is in a (potentially terminal) state of decline. This extends across 
multiple dimensions of religiosity, such as membership of religious organisations, attendance 
at places of worship and personal beliefs in God, and is associated with a range of causal 
dynamics linked to the onset of modernity. These include the rise of the natural sciences 
                                                        
1 Phillip Gorski, “Historicizing the secularization debate: church, state and society in late medieval and 
early modern Europe, ca.1300 to 1700”, American Sociological Review, 65 no.1 (2000): 138-67; also see 
Sharon Hanson, “The secularisation thesis: talking at cross purposes”, Journal of Contemporary Religion, 
12 no.2 (1997): 159-79. 
2 
(which have displaced religious explanations about the workings of the natural world), the 
functional differentiation of the state (which has progressively de-coupled religious 
organisations from their role as welfare providers), the growth of cultural diversity 
(undermining religious claims to universal truth) and the role of existential security (with 
control over the natural and social environment supplanting the need for religious 
certainties).2 
Advocates of secularisation theory point to a range of statistics on measures such as 
membership and belief to support the claim that the social, cultural and political importance 
of religion is decreasing. Critics, however, highlight a variety of conceptual and empirical 
problems. These include the assertion that secularisation is being eroded (or even reversed) 
by a ‘return of religion’ to public life, notions about the emergence of ‘post-secular’ societies 
and the claim that religion is undergoing a change in form – shifting from organised to more 
informal, individualised varieties – rather than experiencing a linear trend of decline.3  
Research into the impact of secularisation on religious actors has suggested that these 
processes can serve as a driver for more conservative forms of religion (including religious 
fundamentalism) and lead to vigorous attempts at re-asserting a role for faith in the public 
sphere.4 One aspect that has been relatively under-examined in these debates, however, has 
                                                        
2 For selected examples see David Voas and Mark Chaves, “Is the United States a counterexample to the 
secularisation thesis?” American Journal of Sociology, 121 no.5 (2016): 1517-56; Clive Field, “Another 
window on British secularization: public attitudes to church and clergy since the 1960s”, Contemporary British 
History, 28, no.2 (2014): 190-218; Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and 
Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Callum Brown, The Death of Christian 
Britain: Understanding Secularisation, 1800-2000 (London, Routledge, 2009). 
3 On these points see Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1994); Titus Hjelm (ed.) Is God Back? Reconsidering the New Visibility of Religion (London, 
Bloomsbury, 2016); Grace Davie, Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox, 2nd Edition (London, Wiley-
Blackwell, 2015); John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, God is Back: How the Global Rise of Faith is 
Changing the World (London, Penguin, 2009); Philip Gorski and Ates Altinordu, “After secularisation?” 
American Review of Sociology, 34 (2008): 55-85; Cesare Merlini, “A post-secular world?” Survival, 53 no.2 
(2011): 117-130.  
4 For example, see Peter Achterberg, Dick Houtman, Stef Aupers, Wellem de Koster, Peter Mascini and Jeroen 
van der Waal, “A Christian cancellation of the secularist truce? Waning Christian religiosity and waxing 
religious deprivatisation in the West”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48 no.4 (2009): 687-701; 
Sarah Wilkins-Laflamme, “Secularization and the wider gap in values and personal religiosity between the 
religious and nonreligious”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 55 no.4 (2016): 717–736; Steven 
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been the impact of secularisation on the public discourse of religious actors. Public discourse 
forms one of the principal means by which religious actors can seek to promote and justify 
their views on social and political issues, and to try and shape wider opinion within the public 
sphere. In recent years religious actors have made a number of high-profile and often 
controversial interventions in a range of public debates, covering themes such as the limits of 
free speech, reproductive rights, assisted dying and social cohesion.5 This article explores this 
topic through the lens of religious opposition to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 
Britain. This provides an interesting test case, not least because attitudes towards 
homosexuality are closely linked to theological beliefs and levels of religiosity. 6  While 
variation between and within religions exists (Muslims and evangelical Christians have been 
found to hold more conservative views than Buddhists and Hindus, for instance), the general 
trend is clear. As Whitley Jr explains: ‘most forms of religiosity … are related in varying 
degrees to negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men’.7 And as Jackle and Wenzelburger 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Kettell, “The militant strain: an analysis of anti-secular discourse in Britain”, Political Studies, 6 no.3 (2015): 
512-528. 
5 The relatively small corpus of research in this area includes: Ted Jelen, “Political Esperanto: rhetorical 
resources and limitations of the Christian Right in the United States”, Sociology of Religion 66 no.3 (2005): 
303-21; Stephen Hunt, “The rhetoric of rights in the UK Christian churches regarding non-heterosexual 
citizenship’, Politics and Religion Journal, 4 no.2 (2010): 183-200; Katherine E. Knutson, “Breaking the 
Chains? constraint and the political rhetoric of religious interest groups”, Politics and Religion, 4 (2011): 
312–337; Jeremy N. Thomas and Daniel V. A. Olson, “Evangelical elites’ changing responses to 
homosexuality 1960–2009”, Sociology of Religion, 73 no.3 (2012): 239-272; Stephen Hunt, “Christian 
lobbyist groups and the negotiation of sexual rights in the UK”, Journal of Contemporary Religion, 29 no.1 
(2014): 121-136; Elaine Graham, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Public Theology in a Post-Secular Age 
(London: SCM Press, 2013). Jeremy N. Thomas, “Outsourcing moral authority: the internal secularization 
of evangelicals’ anti-pornography narratives”, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 52 no.3 (2014): 
457–475. 
6 See Amy Adamczyk and Cassady Pitt, “Shaping attitudes about homosexuality: the role of religion and 
cultural context”, Social Science Research, 38 (2009): 338-351; David R. Hodge, “Epistemological 
frameworks, homosexuality and religion: how people of faith understand the intersection between 
homosexuality and religion”, Social Work, 50 no.3 (2005): 207-218; Andrew Kam-Tuck Yip, “Queering 
religious texts: an exploration of British non-heterosexual Christians’ and Muslims’ strategy of constructing 
sexuality- affirming hermeneutics”, Sociology, 39 no.1 (2009): 47-65. 
7 Bernard E. Whitley Jr, “Religiosity and attitudes towards lesbians and gay men: a meta analysis”, 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 19 no.1 (2009): 21-38. 
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concur: ‘people who attribute great importance to God in their lives or who describe 
themselves as religious are more homonegative’.8 
These findings have been replicated by research into the British context. Here, attitudes 
towards homosexual relations have liberalised in recent decades but the influence of 
religiosity remains strong. According to figures from British Social Attitudes, the proportion 
of religious adults describing same-sex sexual relations as ‘always wrong’ fell from 55% in 
1983 to 41% by 2000, but regular attendees at a place of worship held more conservative 
positions, at 61% and 49% respectively. In contrast, adults identifying as non-religious were 
notably more permissive, with 41% claiming that same-sex relations were always wrong in 
1983, and with this figure falling to 28% by 2000. 9  More recent data confirms the 
continuation of these trends. Public opinion surveys have shown that attitudes continue to 
liberalise across a range of issues, such as equal opportunities for same-sex couples, same-sex 
adoption, same-sex marriage and the role of homosexuals in public life, but levels of 
religiosity continue to exert a determining influence.10  
Figures also show that Britain is becoming an increasingly secular country. The proportion of 
the adult population describing themselves as ‘Christian’ has fallen from 67% in 1983 to 41% 
in 2016, while the proportion identifying with ‘no religion’ has grown from 31% to 53% over 
the same period.11 These findings are supported by a raft of additional surveys and studies 
suggesting that secularising trends run through every indicator of religiosity.12 In this context 
some research has suggested that religious actors may find it strategically useful to turn away 
                                                        
8 Sebastian Jackle and Georg Wenzelburger, “Religion, religiosity, and the attitudes towards homosexuality – a 
multilevel analysis of 79 countries”, Journal of Homosexuality, 62 no.2 (2015): 207-41. 
9 See Alasdair Crockett and David Voas, “A divergence of views: attitude change and the religious crisis over 
homosexuality”, Sociological Research Online, 8 no.4. (2003): 1-11. Table. 2. 
10 Ben Clements, “Attitudes towards gay rights”, British Religion in Numbers, January 2017. 
http://www.brin.ac.uk/figures/attitudes-towards-gay-rights/; on these issues also see Andrew Village and Leslie 
J. Francis, “Attitude toward homosexuality among Anglicans in England: the effects of theological orientation 
and personality”, Journal of Empirical Theology, 21 no.1 (2008): 68-87.  
11 These figures are available from: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/media/1469605/BSA-religion.pdf 
12 For instance, see Steve Bruce, “Post-secularity and religion in Britain: an empirical assessment”, Journal of 
Contemporary Religion, 28 no.3 (2013): 369-384.  
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from the use of theological language and instead attempt to frame their arguments in overtly 
secular terms. As Stephen Hunt puts it, the use of a secular public discourse can ‘afford a 
cloak of respectability for many mainstream denominations and even conservative Christian 
groupings that struggle for legitimacy in the context of a post-Christian UK where they are 
increasingly losing influence’.13 
This research for this study was based on a qualitative analysis of documentary sources from 
national-level religious organisations engaged in the public debate on the issue of same-sex 
marriage. This included transcripts of Parliamentary records, public consultation responses, 
press releases and reports, and was supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews 
with elite representatives from a number of the key oppositional groups involved.14 To help 
ascertain the novelty or otherwise of any contemporary trends, this research was combined 
with an historical analysis of House of Lords debates on themes connected to homosexual 
rights throughout the twentieth century, as well as an analysis of historical media reports that 
were located using the database LexisNexis. The results of this analysis are consistent with 
the idea of a strategic shift towards a secular public discourse, showing that religious actors 
challenging the legalisation of same-sex marriage did so by deploying arguments that largely 
eschewed theological language in favour of overtly secular frames.  
 
The legalisation of same-sex marriage 
In recent years the legalisation of same-sex marriage has become a controversial political 
issue in many parts of the world. Following in the footsteps of the Netherlands (which 
legalised same-sex marriage in 2000), same-sex unions have been formally recognised by a 
                                                        
13 Stephen Hunt, “The rhetoric of rights in the UK Christian churches regarding non-heterosexual citizenship”, 
Politics and Religion Journal, 4 no.2 (2010): 183-200.  
14 These interviews were conducted during 2013 as part of a separate project into the identity of Conservative 
Christian groups in the UK. The interviews typically lasted for one hour and followed a standard pattern of 
questioning. All participants held positions at a senior operational and policy-making level within their 
respective institutions. 
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variety of countries, including: Belgium and the United States (since 2003), Spain and 
Canada (2005), South Africa (2006), Norway, Sweden and Mexico (2009), Portugal, Iceland 
and Argentina (2010), Denmark (2012), New Zealand, France and Brazil (2013), Colombia 
(2016) and Finland, Germany and Australia (2017).  
In Britain the issue of same-sex marriage emerged on the political agenda in 2011, following 
an announcement by the Scottish government (for which marriage is a devolved issue) that it 
intended to legalise same-sex unions. In response, the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
stated that England and Wales would follow suit. The announcements were followed by two 
public consultations and the proposals to legalise same-sex unions eventually passed into law 
in 2013.  
The plans to legalise same-sex marriage were publicly opposed by the vast majority of 
religious organisations (with support from a small minority, most notably the Quakers and 
the Unitarians). Yet the public discourse that was deployed by religious actors largely 
eschewed the use of theological claims. For the most part, overt theological justifications 
remained the preserve of a small number of fringe and relatively minor organisations. 
Amongst these included the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, whose consultation 
response asserted that same-sex marriage was ‘forbidden by the law of God’,15 Christian 
Watch, which declared that ‘[n]o Bible believing God fearing Christian organisation would 
allow practising homosexuals in their fellowship’,16 and Christian Contact, which maintained 
that homosexuality was ‘an abomination’ and a just cause for being ‘put to death’.17 Two 
umbrella groups opposing same-sex marriage were also explicit in their use of theological 
language. RealMarriage (organised by the Evangelical Presbyterian Church of England and 
Wales) declared its opposition to be based ‘on the Bible alone’, and described the proposals 
                                                        
15 Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, Free Presbyterian Submission Same-Sex Marriage, November 30, 2012. 
16 Christian Watch, Response to Scottish Government Consultation Questions, 2012. 
17 Christian Contact, Response to Scottish Government Consultation Questions, 2012. 
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as a ‘defiance of God’s moral authority’.18 Keep Marriage Special aimed ‘to defend the 
biblical definition of marriage’ and maintained that: ‘The primary argument against the 
proposed redefinition of marriage is therefore theological: what God has ordained in his 
written word, neither society nor any government is free to redefine’.19 Representatives of 
minority faiths also tended to frame their objections to same-sex marriage in theological 
terms. A campaign launched by the Muslim Council of Britain (called Muslims Defending 
Marriage) explicitly focused on Islamic teachings and claimed that marriage was ‘defined by 
Allah’.20 
However, such cases were comparatively atypical. Most religious organisations deploying 
theological justifications did so in a moderate and limited fashion, instead basing the large 
majority of their opposition on secular arguments. The Church of England (the single largest 
Christian organisation in Britain) restricted its theological claims to a declaration that the 
Church’s freedom of manoeuvre on the issue was ‘limited by the word of God in Holy 
Scripture’,21 with the Archbishop of Canterbury going so far as to tell the House of Lords 
that: ‘This is not a faith issue … It is about the general social good’.22 Likewise, the Church 
of Scotland founded its opposition on a variety of legal and technical matters, focusing on 
internal church procedures for resolving disputes. 23  The Scottish Episcopal Church, too, 
centred on technical matters of process, restricting its theological assertions to a statement 
                                                        
18 These quotations are taken from the now-defunct campaign website: http://www.realmarriage.org.uk/about-us, 
available using the Wayback Archive at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120705122300/http://www.realmarriage.org.uk/index.php/submission (date 
stamped: 5 July 2012). URL accessed 14 February 2018. 
19 The campaign website is also new defunct but remains accessible via: 
http://wayback.archive.org/web/20121103011151/http://www.keepmarriagespecial.org.uk/main/why-kms (date 
stamped, 3 November 2012). URL accessed 14 February 2018. 
20 Muslim Council of Britain, Response to the Government Equalities Office Consultation, 14 June 2012. 
21 Church of England, Evangelical Council, St Matthias Day Statement, 14 May 2012; also see Church of 
England, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill: Commons Second Reading Briefing’, February 2013. 
22 Hansard. House of Lords Debates, 3 June 2013, col.954. 
23 Church of Scotland, ‘The Registration of Civil Partnerships Same Sex Marriage’, Response to Scottish 
Consultation. December 2011. 
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that heterosexual marriage was ‘instituted by God’. 24  The theological language of the 
Orthodox Church was more ambiguous still, consisting of brief references to ‘divinely-
inscribed patterns of human relationship’.25  
The public discourse deployed by many religious actors made no direct theological 
references at all. Official representations from the Christian Institute (one of the most active 
Christian cause groups in Britain) eschewed theological references in favour of a focus on the 
supposed threats posed to religious freedom. 26  The Christian social reform organisation, 
Jubilee, explicitly highlighted ‘a non-religious case for retaining the current legal definition 
of marriage’, noting that ‘plural democracy will only survive if we also offer each other 
reasons we can expect each other to share’.27 The Church in Wales followed a similar course, 
stating that its purpose was ‘not to engage in the debate about the nature of marriage, or the 
recognition of same-sex relationships, from a theological perspective’.28 And as the advocacy 
group, Christian Action Research and Education, explained: ‘The challenge facing Christians 
who do not believe that same-sex marriage is part of God’s purpose for society, is defending 
the current legal definition. This depends on having good non-religious arguments’.29 
 
Secular justifications 
Overall, the public discourse of religious groups opposed to the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage made limited use of theological justifications. Overtly theological claims were 
                                                        
24 Scottish Episcopal Church, ‘Response of the Faith and Order Board of the General Synod of the Scottish 
Episcopal Church’, 6 December 2012. 
25 Orthodox Church, ‘Response of the Orthodox Christian Churches in Britain and Ireland to the Government 
Consultation on ‘Same-Sex Marriage’’, 4 June 2012. 
26 Christian Institute, ‘Plans to legalise homosexual marriage in Scotland’, April 2011. Available at: 
http://www.christian.org.uk/wp-content/downloads/homosexual-marriage-in-scotland.pdf (URL accessed, 14 
February 2018); Christian Institute, Response to Scottish Government Consultation Questions, 2012. 
27 Julian Rivers, “Redefining marriage: the case for caution’, Jubilee Centre, Cambridge Papers, 21 no.3 (2012). 
Available at http://www.jubilee-centre.org/redefining-marriage-the-case-for-caution/ (URL accessed 14 
February 2018). 
28 Church in Wales, ‘Response to “Equal Civil Marriage: A Consultation”’, March 2012. 
29 Christian Action Research and Education, ‘Twelve compelling reasons for rejecting same-sex marriage’, May 
2012. 
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restricted to a small number of relatively marginal groups, and organisations using religious 
arguments did so only to a limited extent. A central characteristic of the oppositional public 
discourse used by religious actors was its emphasis on secular reasons. These arguments 
revolved around four key themes: tradition, social utility, democratic values and the threat to 
religious liberties.  
 
Tradition 
The first secular argument deployed by religious opponents of same-sex marriage emphasised 
the historical and traditional sources of authority for defining marriage as an explicitly 
heterosexual category. This was presented as a feature of all human societies and changing 
the definition of marriage was thus said to be beyond the purview of the state. The Church of 
England claimed that the ‘intrinsic nature of marriage’ as a heterosexual institution was 
‘deeply rooted in our social culture’, and was something ‘which predates church and state’.30 
The Orthodox Church emphasised the historical roots of marriage for the purposes of 
procreation, noting that such an institution had been observed ‘by virtually all cultures for 
thousands of years’.31 The Catholic Church made the same point, highlighting the existence 
of a ‘commonly understood definition of marriage’ that ‘pre-dates the Church’ as well as ‘all 
the cultures and societies of today’.32 The largest oppositional campaign group, Coalition for 
Marriage, asserted that heterosexual marriage was ‘as old as the hills’ and was ‘not a recent 
invention of society to be refashioned on a political whim’.33  
 
Social utility 
                                                        
30 Church of England, ‘A Response to the Government Equalities Office Consultation - “Equal Civil Marriage”’, 
13 June 2012; Church of England, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill: Commons Second Reading Briefing’. 
31 Orthodox Church, ‘Response of the Orthodox Christian Churches in Britain and Ireland to the Government 
Consultation on “Same-Sex Marriage”’. 
32 Response from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales to the Government Consultation on 
“Equal Civil Marriage”, June 2012. 
33 Coalition for Marriage, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill. Second Reading Briefing’, January 2013. 
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The second argument used against the legalisation of same-sex marriage centred on claims 
about the social benefits of heterosexual unions. This was said to provide the bedrock for 
human society, forming the principal basis for social cohesion, order and stability. Opponents 
claimed that same-sex unions would undermine marriage as an institution, leading to far-
reaching and negative social consequences, including greater family breakdowns and rising 
levels of delinquency. Warning of ‘the uncertain and unforeseen consequences for wider 
society and the common good when marriage is redefined in gender-neutral terms’, the 
Church of England asserted that heterosexual marriage ‘benefits society in many ways, by 
promoting mutuality and fidelity’.34 Similar points were highlighted by the Catholic Church, 
which described heterosexual marriage as serving ‘the common good of society’ and claimed 
that: ‘Fundamentally changing the definition of marriage … will have far reaching long-term 
consequences, many of them unintended’. 35  Concerns about the social impact of the 
proposals were also raised by the Evangelical Alliance, which warned that they would 
‘inevitably weaken the place of the family in society’, creating ‘a social, political and cultural 
disaster’. 36  This point was echoed by the Coalition for Marriage, which noted that 
heterosexual marriage was ‘a bedrock institution and the most stable environment for raising 
children’.37 
 
Democratic values  
The third form of secular argumentation held that the legalisation of same-sex marriage was 
unnecessary and unwanted. Many religious actors highlighted the lack of a democratic 
mandate for introducing the plans, pointing out that none of the main political parties had 
                                                        
34 Church of England, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill: Commons Second Reading Briefing’. 
35 Response from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales to the Government Consultation on 
“Equal Civil Marriage”; Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, ‘Briefing to Members of 
Parliament on the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill’, 29 January 2013. 
36 Evangelical Alliance, ‘Response by Evangelical Alliance to the Consultation on “Gay Marriage”’, 14 June 
2012. 
37 Coalition for Marriage, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill. Second Reading Briefing’. 
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included same-sex marriage in their general election manifestos, and claiming that the 
proposals had no support from the general public. A British Social Attitudes survey reporting 
that same-sex marriage was opposed by 63% of respondents was frequently cited, as was a 
survey conducted by ComRes which put the figure at 70%.38 Opponents added that same-sex 
couples could already obtain the legal benefits of marriage through civil partnerships and that 
permitting them to marry was not essential in order to achieve equality objectives.  
These themes were evident in the stance taken by the Evangelical Alliance, which claimed 
that the proposals had been fuelled by ‘liberal elites in the media and politics’ and were 
tantamount to a form of ‘coercive social engineering’ designed to serve a ‘tiny, 
unrepresentative and ideologically motivated minority’.39 In the same vein, the Church of 
England complained about the lack of democratic engagement, claiming that the proposals 
‘did not feature in party manifestos’ and would ‘deliver no obvious legal gains given the 
rights already conferred by civil partnerships’.40 Concerns about the un-democratic nature of 
the plans were also emphasised by the Christian Institute, which stated that it was 
‘particularly wrong for politicians to redefine marriage in the face of opposition from a 
majority of the public’,41 and similar points were made by the Coalition for Marriage, which 
attacked the proposals as being ‘profoundly anti-democratic’.42 Following the same pattern, 
the Catholic Church maintained that ‘same sex couples already effectively enjoy equivalent 
legal rights as heterosexual couples’, and claimed that the proposals had ‘no clear mandate’ 
given that ‘[t]he British public, as a whole, did not seek this change’.43 
 
                                                        
38  British Social Attitudes, 24th report (NatCen, 2008); ComRes, ‘Papal Visit’, 12 September 2010, 
http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-catholic-survey-on-papal-visit-12-september-2010/ URL accessed 15 
February 2018. 
39 Evangelical Alliance, ‘Response by Evangelical Alliance to the Consultation on “Gay Marriage”’. 
40 Church of England, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill: Commons Second Reading Briefing’. 
41 Christian Institute, Response to Scottish Government Consultation Questions. 
42 Coalition for Marriage, ‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill. Second Reading Briefing’. 
43 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, ‘Briefing to Members of Parliament on the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Bill’. 
12 
Religious liberties 
The final secular argument in the case against legalising same-sex marriage focused on the 
rights and liberties of religious groups and individuals. Opponents claimed that redefining 
marriage would discriminate against people who wished to belong to (and to proclaim the 
virtues of marriage as) an exclusively heterosexual institution and would be intrinsically 
unfair. Government reassurances that legal safeguards would protect defenders of ‘traditional’ 
marriage from legal action and would protect religious institutions from being forced to 
conduct same-sex marriages, were said to be of little value given the capacity of activists to 
pursue their agenda through the legal system.  
The view of the Church of England reflected a number of these concerns, including the 
government’s ability ‘to make the legislation watertight against challenge in the European 
courts’, and ‘whether the proffered legal protection for churches and faiths from 
discrimination claims would prove durable’.44 These points were repeated by the Catholic 
Church, which warned that the proposals would set ‘a dangerous precedent for government 
interference with other religious organisations’, and argued that the risk of a legal challenge 
from the European Court of Human Rights was ‘a significant threat’. 45  Other religious 
organisations made similar claims. The Orthodox Church warned that the plans threatened 
‘the freedom of religious communities to maintain and practise their traditional understanding 
of marriage’.46 The Christian Institute complained that changing the law would ‘redefine 
marriage for the whole of society’, and warned that: ‘If marriage is redefined all the evidence 
suggests there will surely be an erosion of religious liberty and freedom of conscience’.47 The 
Evangelical Alliance claimed that same-sex marriage ‘directly denies the rights of married 
                                                        
44 Church of England, ‘A Response to the Government Equalities Office Consultation’; Church of England, 
‘Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill: Commons Second Reading Briefing’. 
45 Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales, ‘Briefing to Members of Parliament on the Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Bill’. 
46 Orthodox Church, ‘Response of the Orthodox Christian Churches in Britain and Ireland to the Government 
Consultation on “Same-Sex Marriage”’. 
47 Christian Institute, Response to Scottish Government Consultation Questions. 
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couples to be part of a unique institution reserved for one man and one woman based on their 
complementary biology and procreative potential’.48 
 
Responding to secularisation 
The character of the public discourse outlined here is consistent with the view that religious 
groups operating in a largely secularised environment will deploy secular, rather than 
theological, modes of argumentation in order to try and maximise their appeal. The strategic 
nature of the public discourse used in the case of same-sex marriage can be further 
highlighted in three ways: (1) by the historical use of theological language by religious 
actors; (2) in the contrast between the public and the private (internal) discourse used by 
oppositional groups; and (3) by interview responses given by elite-level representatives from 
some of the leading groups involved. 
 
An historical shift 
The use of a secular public discourse by religious actors opposing same-sex marriage appears 
to have been something of a departure from historical practice on the issue of homosexual 
rights. While a direct comparison between historical periods is impossible for a number of 
reasons (one being that many of the cause groups involved in the debate around same-sex 
marriage were only established towards the end of the twentieth century), and while a full 
and comprehensive account of the various trends and dynamics of religious public discourse 
on homosexual rights lies beyond the scope of this study, is it instructive nevertheless to note 
that religious actors engaging in public debates on these issues have frequently grounded 
their case in theological justifications.49  
                                                        
48 Evangelical Alliance (2012), ‘Response by Evangelical Alliance to the Consultation on “Gay Marriage”’. 
49 On this point also see Ian Machin, Churches and Social Issues in Twentieth-Century Britain (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1998). 
14 
The debate around decriminalising homosexual practices first emerged in the late 1950s 
following the publication of the Wolfenden Report, which recommended decriminalising 
certain homosexual offences. Supporting the view of the Wolfenden Report, senior members 
of the Church of England began to argue that crime and sin should now be treated separately, 
and that homosexual acts could best be treated as a medical, pastoral and (ultimately) a moral 
issue. Yet, while much of this debate revolved around secular themes, it was not uncommon 
to find senior Anglicans framing homosexuality in theological terms. 50 During a debate on 
homosexual offences in 1965, for example, the Archbishop of Canterbury told the House of 
Lords that homosexual behaviour was ‘utterly abominable’ and that homosexual practices 
were a sin – although quite how sinful they were remained something of a mystery given the 
rather complicated business of weighing up the different forms of sexual activity. As he put 
it: ‘I think it is extraordinarily hard for any of us to assess the relative seriousness of sins. 
When we start doing that we get into questions to which the Almighty Himself knows the 
answer and we do not’. Nevertheless, the Archbishop continued, ‘homosexual behaviour has 
an unnaturalness about it which makes it vile’. This, he explained, was derived from ‘a 
general emotion linked in the mind between the crime of sodomy and the behaviour of the 
people of Sodom and Gomorrah in the story in the Book of Genesis, who incurred the Divine 
anger for the most horrible sins’. 51 In a similar, if less colourful fashion, the Bishop of St 
Albans concurred that it was the Church’s view that: ‘all homosexual acts are intrinsically 
sinful’, 52  the Bishop of London reasserted that the position of the Church was that, in 
supporting decriminalisation, ‘we do not condone homosexual practices; nor do we regard 
them as in any way less sinful’,53 and the Bishop of Leicester maintained that: ‘It would be a 
                                                        
50 On these issues, and for an opposing view, see Matthew Grimley, “Law, morality and secularisation: the 
Church of England and the Wolfenden report, 1954-1967”, Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 60 no.4 (2009): 
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52 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 28 June 1965, Col.684. 
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15 
bad day for Britain if we came to the point where law … no longer related in any vital way to 
the law of Nature or, as I should wish to say, to the Law of God’.54 Lord Soper, a Methodist 
minister, maintained that it was the duty of the Church to lead public opinion ‘in the light of 
what we believe to be the Christian principle’, and declared that homosexual acts remained 
firmly within the ‘category of sin’.55 
Following the decriminalisation of homosexual practices in 1967 the theological debate over 
homosexual rights shifted in new directions, centring now on questions of lowering the age of 
consent, on homosexual relations within the clergy and on the distinction between 
homosexual inclinations and practices. Here, too, religious public discourse was based on 
theological justifications. In 1987, for example, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Runcie, 
warned that Britain was in a state of moral decay due, in part, to ‘a decline in a sense of God’, 
and reiterated the Church’s view that homosexual practice ‘is sinful when it's against a 
Christian moral teaching based on the Bible’.56 Runcie’s successor as Archbishop, George 
Carey, followed the same line, maintaining that: ‘The problem is that the Bible is very clearly 
against practicing homosexuality’.57 Underscoring the point, the Archbishop of York, John 
Habgood, maintained that the distinction between homosexual inclination and practices was 
‘rooted in Christian tradition’, and claimed that: ‘there is something fundamental about our 
human nature which is safeguarded within the Christian tradition’.58 
Theological arguments were also evident in the approach taken by the Catholic Church. In 
October 1986 the Vatican issued a statement claiming that homosexuality was contrary to 
‘the rich symbolism and meaning, not to mention the goals, of the creator's sexual design’, 
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55 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 21 June 1965.  
56 Bernard Levin, “Interview with the Archbishop of Canterbury”, Times, 30 March 1987. 
57 Ruth Gledhill, “Carey insists Christianity opposes active gays”, Times, 2 October 1991. 
58 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 20 June 1994, cls.17-18. 
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and was ‘contrary to the creative wisdom of God’. Homosexual inclinations were said to be 
‘objectively alien to order’, and homosexual acts were described as ‘an intrinsic moral evil’.59  
In 1993, ahead of a Parliamentary vote on lowering the age of consent for homosexual 
activities, Cardinal Basil Hume, the leader of the Roman Catholic Church in England and 
Wales, reasserted the Church’s position that ‘homosexual genital acts are objectively 
wrong’,60 and declared that: ‘God expects homosexual people … to keep his law and to work 
towards achieving a difficult ideal’. The aim of the Church, he said, was to bring 
homosexuals to ‘a fuller understanding and realisation of the teaching she holds to be God-
given’.61 Sexual expression, he maintained, was part of ‘God's plan of creation’, and thus the 
church ‘does not approve of homosexual genital acts’.62 
 
Public and private discourse 
While the public discourse used by religious actors in the case of same-sex marriage was a 
break from historical practice, the downplaying of theological justifications also contrasted 
with the use of messages that were primarily directed for consumption by members of 
religious groups themselves. The character of this private (or internal) discourse – involving 
web-based resources, statements in newsletters and promotional appeals – was based far 
more on the use of religious justifications. 
The Evangelical Alliance placed a much greater emphasis on matters of theology when 
communicating directly with their own membership.63 In one ‘Marriage Briefing’ report, for 
instance, the Alliance described heterosexual marriage as being ‘part of God’s plan for the 
world’, claimed that marriage between a man and a woman was ‘emphasised throughout the 
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Bible’, and noted that the differences between the sexes were ‘part of God’s design for 
humanity’. 64  A similar public/private dichotomy was notable in the approach taken by 
Christian Concern. Despite studiously avoiding the use of theological justifications in their 
public discourse on same-sex marriage, material designed specifically for consumption by 
their own members drew on strong theological themes. These included overt references to the 
centrality of Jesus, to the sinful nature of homosexuality and to heterosexual marriage as 
being a ‘gift from God’.65 
The discourse of the Catholic Church followed the same pattern. The arguments used in its 
public pronouncements on the subject were significantly devoid of theological reasoning, the 
rationale for which, as set out in a briefing paper by Catholic Voices (an organisation 
designed to represent Catholicism in the public sphere) was that it was necessary to eschew 
‘theological or religious presuppositions in order to argue from natural-law or reason-based 
propositions’. Catholic Voices claimed that, since civil marriages were ‘outside the authority 
of the Churches, exclusively religious objections to the proposed change are therefore at best 
irrelevant or inappropriate’.66 In contrast, the principal arguments directed towards members 
of the Catholic Church themselves were far more theologically inclined. A letter from the 
Archbishops of Westminster and Southwark, distributed for a public reading at all Catholic 
congregations during Easter 2012, set out a highly religious view of marriage, proclaiming 
this to be ‘sharing in the mission of Christ’ as well as in ‘the mystery of God’s own life … 
between Father, Son and Holy Spirit’.67  
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A similar dynamic was notable in the discourse of Coalition for Marriage, as well as its 
Scottish counterpart, Scotland for Marriage. In their public statements, campaign literature, 
briefing documentation and petitions these campaigns made scarcely any mention of 
theological justifications and centred solely on secular themes and arguments, presenting 
themselves as a broad-based and non-sectarian movement containing people of all faiths and 
none. This public discourse contrasted with the strongly religious underpinnings of both 
groups, which had extensive links to conservative religious bodies. Amongst the founder 
members of Coalition for Marriage included Christian Concern and the Evangelical Alliance, 
and both organisations had close connections to a variety of religious groups, such as 
Christian Action Research and Education, Anglican Mainstream and the Christian Institute.68 
 
Interview materials 
The strategic nature of using a public discourse based on secular language was well-
recognised by representatives of oppositional groups themselves. Explaining why religious 
groups had chosen to use secular, rather than theological, arguments in public, the leader of 
one high-profile national campaign group noted that this was ‘not because they don’t have 
these convictions … it’s because we live in a post-Christian society, so if I use Christian 
arguments most people are not going to be persuaded by them’.69 Thus:  
 
the clear teaching of scripture is that anything outside lifelong monogamous 
heterosexual marriage is off limits … but if I’m arguing it in the public sphere … I’d 
talk about the importance of marriage as the bedrock of society, the difference between 
marriage and civil partnerships, the way if there was a change in the law there’d be 
pressure on churches, marriage registrars, teachers, people working for councils, to 
behave in certain ways … you’ve got to use the language that people connect with … if 
I’m talking to a Christian audience, then I’ll couch it in different ways.70 
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Making the same point, another interviewee stated that, while it was impossible to ‘separate 
the theology out from public discourse’, the use of overtly theological arguments would be 
politically disadvantageous. As they put it:  
 
There’s a time and a place for it … 99% of your Christian discourse is going to be 
implicit rather than explicit in that context, so you’ve got to be sensible about this, I 
think, because it plays into the hands of the secularists who just want to paint us as 
some sort of gung-ho.71 
 
Other representatives also claimed that the use of a secular public discourse complemented, 
rather than contradicted, theological claims. According to one respondent, opposition to 
same-sex marriage was: ‘not that we’re dinosaurs or, you know, stick-in-the-muds … it’s 
everything to do with the way the world is made … all the evidence is that children in a 
secure mother-father family do best’.72 Opposing the legalisation of same-sex marriage with 
secular reasoning, then, was:  
 
Because what we’re trying to do, what Christians in this are trying to do, is persuade … 
the majority, the people who are not swayed by religious arguments as such, that this 
particular view is right … the appeal is made on arguments that are common ground 
arguments, common good arguments, and they should be. If God is the creator, then 
what is good for the creation will be in harmony with what God says.73 
 
Another interviewee made the same point equally strongly. As they maintained: ‘the kind of 
apologetics that I would offer around the position we take is not couched in a religious 
argument … in my view there is enough in science that would support the view that we take’. 
In this context, the use of an overtly secular frame was driven by the fact that ‘most religious 
groups realise that they have a particular take on reality which is not shared across the 
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board’. 74  Following this line, one interviewee argued that a successful defence of 
heterosexual marriage could be made on secular grounds because ‘science shows and studies 
show that children do best when raised by a mother and a father’. Thus: ‘a lot of secular 
interfacing arguments were made because they can be made … I believe them from a faith 
perspective, from believing in the bible, but science and sociology and life backs it up, it 
always does’.75 
One interviewee with a background in helping to organise the lobbying efforts of a prominent 
Christian group with close links to Westminster confirmed that there had been a shift in the 
way in which public discourse was used. Noting that the particular group in question had in 
recent years realised that ‘it was no good quoting scripture, it wasn’t going to do any good’, 
they explained that there had been a growing awareness that ‘they would have to mount 
relevant arguments and, you know, take part in the discourse that was going on, so they’d 
have to provide weights of evidence to support their argument that held water’.76 
 
Conclusion 
The concept of secularisation remains central to social scientific debates about religion, but 
the impact of secularisation processes on religious actors – in particular, their use of public 
discourse – has been notably under-researched. By exploring this theme through an analysis 
of religious opposition to the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Britain, this article has 
shown that religious actors utilised a form of public discourse characterised by a 
downplaying of theological justifications in favour of overtly secular modes of reasoning. 
This framing of the oppositional case is consistent with the idea of a strategic shift in 
response to on-going pressures posed by the changing landscape of religion and belief. In this 
                                                        
74 Interview #6, 6 June 2013.  
75 Interview #3, 25 April 2013. 
76 Interview #5, 23 April 2013.  
21 
context, deploying overtly secular justifications denotes a recognition by religious actors of 
the fact that, in an increasingly pluralised and non-religious society, theological arguments 
will not be sufficiently persuasive for the majority of the general population. This view is 
further supported by the fact that theological arguments were a feature of religious public 
discourse throughout the twentieth century, by the clear dichotomy between the public 
(secular) and the private (theological) discourses used by religious groups, and by interview 
statements made by representatives from some of the leading national-level religious groups 
engaged in the debate around same-sex marriage confirming that their oppositional discourse 
had been designed to fit the changing circumstances in which they were now having to 
operate. Future research in this area, focusing on the public discourse used by religious actors 
on other issues, such as abortion and assisted dying, and studies deploying a more fine-
grained analysis of the changing historical patterns involved, would help to chart and unpack 
these dynamics in greater depth and detail.  
